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ARGUMENT 
Point l 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS IN ITS BRIEF PRESENTED AN ARGUMENT 
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A UECISION BY THIS COURT THAT THE LOWER 
COURT DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT 
THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION HAS PROPERLY TERMINATED. 
Under this point respondent does not address the thrust of appellant's 
issue on appeal, namely that appellant's conduct did not consititute such 
a material breach of contract as would justify termination of the entire 
contract assuming arguendo that the conduct in question constituted breaches 
of the contract. Accordingly respondent here did not contend that appellant's 
conduct would constitute a material failure under Restatement of Contracts 
(2nd) Sec. 241 or that such rule is not or should not be the law. Instead 
respondent asserts that the decision of the lower court is supportable if 
the evidence justifies the trial court's determination that appellant's 
conduct did not "foster the type of relations required under the contract 
of December 23, 1982, to mutually benefit both parties" (P. 4). This 
assertion clearly focuses on the reason for this appeal, to-wit that the 
court did not properly conclude that the main purpose of the contract of 
December 23, 1982, was the delivery of social services to troubled youth 
but rather that the contract was to assure a certain relationship between 
the contracting parties. This misunderstanding of the contract makes under-
standable the trial court's citation of appellant's refusal for reasons of 
expense to relocate his office (Findings of Fact No. 4) which would 
certainly be a proper instruction for one in an employment relationship but 
not one in an independent contractor relationship. The same is true also 
with to the phone call which is the basis of Findings of Fact 
No. 3. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT MISCONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE BY SHOWING THE 
ACfC, WERE MINOR UI fJATURE AND DID NOT INVOLVE THE MAIN PURPOSE OF 
THE CONTRAcr 
(l) Phone January 10, 1983 (Find_i_Q_gs of 
Whether or not in his deposition of March 8, 1983, Kent Burke 
did not remember the phone call he made to Mr. Van Vleet after appellant's 
call to the same genelemen or appellant's call to Mr. Van the fact 
remains that at least part of this transaction was not so important to him 
that he recalled in just a few weeks later, a factor of importance in 
determining whether it had such an adverse effect on the state agency as 
to constitute a breach. 
More important than the breach, however, if it was one, is 
whether it went to the main purpose of the contract. Clearly it did not 
as it did not involve rendering social services to troubled youth. 
(2) Request of January 31, 1983, to move office (Findings of Fact No. 4) 
Respondent's argument under this subpoint would be well taken if 
the contract's main purpose involved the parties' relationship. As noted 
above, however, it did not and it was wholly irrelevant as to the social 
services to be rendered by appellant as to where he maintained his office. 
5) 
A fair reading of the transcript on this point clearly shows that both 
parties were seeking a legal means whereby respondent could pay appellant 
Sl ,:,110 (011P-half ot the first $3,000 per month contemplated by the contract) 
ctriJ the rnanual was the: vf:hicle they used to justify that. Appellant never 
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contended that he would not have to provide the hours of service that 
sum represented less the 5 hours (not one hour as respondent contends -
see Finding of Fact No. 5) This points up the core of this entire dispute -
the failure if not refusal of resµondent to assiqn social service tasks 
sufficient for appellant to earn his $3,000 per month rather than wait until 
June 30, 1983, to receive $18,000 for doing nothing, a situation appellant 
objected to on behalf of the youth needing services as well as for his own 
benefit. 
(4) Plaintiff-Appellant's meeting with Steve Trotter (Findings of 
Fact No. 6) 
Despite the conflict in the testimony between appellant and Burke 
on behalf of respondent with respect to oral permission to make this contract 
as pointed out in respondent's brief, the application of the well settled 
presumption that evidence available to a party which is not produced will 
be presumed to be adverse leads one to conclude here that this contract did 
not produce any adverse effects since respondent did not produce any of the 
five parties who might have supported its position on this point, namely the 
two social workers, Roy Hussy and Matt Calpool, the foster parents, or the 
boy himself. Jn any event the court made no finding of any adverse effect 
and could not have done so as there was no evidence to justify it or even 
infer it. At most it was a violation of protocol which did not go to a 
material aspect of the contract. 
With respect to the home parent training and counseling program 
assigned on January 20, 1983, appellant did not address that in its brief 
as the trial court did not make any findings with respect to it. Appellant 
respectfully submits to this court that the implication in respondent's 
brief that the fact that this assignment was not completed prior to respondent's 
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termination of the contract is without any support in the record. Within 
such a short period it would be totally unreasonable to complete such a 
project. 
Respondent concludes under this point as follows: "Each of 
these goes to the very heart of the contract and the type of relationship 
needed in a contract for professional services" underscoring added). In 
short respondent urges this Court to look to the relationship of the 
contracting parties rather than to the contract itself in determining 
whether certain conduct breaches an agreement. Such a proposition seeks 
a fundamental change in contract law totally unsupported by precedent or 
principle. 
Point 3 
THE TERMINATION WAS NOT PROPERLY BASED ON REASONABLE 
GROUNDS AND DONE IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED UNDER A 
TERMINATION "FOR CAUSE" PROVISION. 
Except for the ipse dixit declaration that " ... the acts of 
Plaintiff-Appellant clearly meet the test of materiality as set forth in 
the cases as well as the restatement section cited" respondent makes no 
effort to argue materiality. Certainly it sets forth no specifics and 
cites no cases where similar acts only remotely connected with a professional 
service contract breached it so materially as to warrant termination. 
Respondent cites Restatement of Contracts (2nd) Sec. 283 which is 
entitled "Agreement of Recission" as stating a distinction between termination 
of contracts and cancellation of contracts. This is not so but comment (a) 
to that section points out that distinction in the course of distinguishing 
both from an agreement of recission. It is evident in the instant case, 
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however, that the respondent, the trial court, and the respondent's brief 
itself ('.;Ece P. 5 ) all based their : ilim to nullification of the 
subject contract on the grounds of cancellation not termination within 
the meaning of those terms as used in that comment. 
Appellant takes no issue with the general proposition that "grounds 
for termination of a contract under express provisions therein are controlled 
by such provisions, which ordinarily will be enforced according to their 
terms" and the three texts in support thereof cited by respondent on P. 11 
so state. However, none of them lend any support to respondent's implication 
that a right to terminate "for cause" gave either of these contracting 
parties a right to terminate the contract for reasons which would not justify 
termination for a material breach under the rules set forth in Restatement 
of Contracts (2nd) Section 241. If the contract were silent as to the grounds 
for termination R 241 would require a material breach. Is it not fair to say 
that the specification of "good cause" was for the very purpose of incorporat-
ing a material breach standard so no one could contend on the one hand that 
any breach however trivial would justify termination nor on the other hand 
that the contract could not be ended during its term no matter how gross 
the breaches might be. In short appellant submits that the inclusion of 
"good cause" gave him the protection of the materiality standard afortori. 
Appellants' research failed to locate any Utah decision discussing 
"good cause" in a contract. 
With respect to Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., Inc., 199 SE 489 
(Vin. 1938) the facts there speak for themselves in showing how very 
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opposite that case was fro111 the instant one. The court's opinion as to 
that states on r. 4Y'; 
[9] The evidence shows that the venture had failed. The 
plaintiff and the defendant were each ad111ittedly insolvent, 
certainly so far dS funds were required for the prosecution 
of the venture. No donations or contracts for advertisements 
had been received for several 111onths. It was costing more to 
publish and circulate the paper than the defendant was realizing 
therefro111. Quick had been advanced, from time to time, more 
than $3,000. He had failed to pay the expenses of the promotion 
campaign from his commissions. He had overdrawn a sum in excess 
of the amount he was entitled to under the contract. Approximately 
25% of the subscriptions were being cancelled for lack of payment 
by the subscribers. Both parties were going further and further 
into debt every month. All these facts and circumstances were 
fully and fairly known to each of the111, and discussed by them. 
The situation was that neither of them was able to fairly fulfill 
the provisions of the contract, nor to realize their first expecta-
tions. A termination of the contract relation would manifestly avoid 
further loss to each of them. There was nothing to indicate that 
conditions would improve in the future. No advantage to either 
could be gained by continuing the precarious situation. The entire 
circumstances afforded good and just grounds for bringing the contract 
to an end. 
Nowhere is the testi111ony of the defendant's officers denied, or 
contradicted. The evidence discloses that the notice of cancellation 
was given in good faith. The facts therein contained, except as to 
the amount of money originally claimed to be due from the plaintiff, 
are admitted to be true. The erroneous amount claimed was corrected 
upon a proper audit. 
Quick did not disagree with the material facts contained in the 
letter or notice of cancellation of August 2nd. He admitted that he 
was unable to perform his part of the contract, and to keep his 
representatives in the field, for lack of money. This latter 
admission, with the consequences necessarily following therefrom, 
if it did not actually constitute a legal breach of the contract 
under the circu111stances, taken in connection with the other facts, 
furnished an additional ground for termination of the contract. 
As for R. J. 32 Cal. Rept. 545 (Cal. App. 1963) 
the issue t11Pre with rP,pect to "yood cause" termination was solely whether 
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the existence of such a 1·•1L"1i,10n nonde;erl the contract invalid as an 
arbitrary and absolute power to cancel it. It held that it did not (head 
notes 14-16 on P. 559). It certainly gives no support for the proposition 
that acts not breaches of contract or breaches of contract which are not 
material may constitute ''9ood grounds." 
Even if this Court were to adopt the "for cause" termination rule as 
advocated by respondent despite its vagueness and lack of acceptance, 
appellant submits that the foregoing minor breaches of contract, if they 
were breaches at all, do not establish the first of the two requirements, 
aamely "reasonable grounds" (Respondent's brief P. 11). As for the second 
of the requirements, that is good faith the evidence is especially clear 
as to the absence of that requirement. This is clearly demonstrated by 
' respondent's answer admitting this allegation of the complaint (No. 3): 
On February 4, 1983, Michael L. Hutchings advised 
Plaintiff's attorney that Defendant was sending a letter 
that date to Plaintiff advising him that the subject 
contract was terminated for cause. 
Four days thereafter on February 8, 1983, respondent's president wrote 
appellant as follows: 
I appreciate your eagerness to get going on your next 
assignment; however we are in the process of putting together 
our program and trying to determine which Y.C. workers will let 
you counsel with them. I hope you will bear with us while we 
determine where we can best use your talents. I expect to use 
your talents on a weekly basis qiving you new assignments to 
do as you complete old ones e<tc , so that you can earn up to 
your contracted maximum amo1or1t cJlld even more on occasion each 
month. 
Then two days later without anything further transpiring appellant 
received the formal letter of termination which is Exhibit D-32 in this case. 
!L's true that the Court stated that respondent acted in good faith 
lT 121 ,122) but no finding of that fact was made in the Findings of Fact 
(R 58-60) and in any event could not be supported on the basis of respondent's 
own acts and admissions set forth above. 
The letter of February 8, 1983, is also significant in showinq 
respondent's awareness of appellant's basic complaint that he was not being 
al lowed to earn the monthly income he expected because the respondent had 
not given him a single assignment to work with troubled youth for whose 
benefit respondent had contracted with the State to serve (Ex P-10) and 
the subject contract was the means of providing such service. Thus it 
provides strong support for appellant's argument that this factor was 
the basic cause of the difficulties between the parties. That issue was 
highlighted in the statement of facts in both briefs. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent did not have any legal justification to terminate the contract 
of December 23, 1982, on February 10, 1983, either on the basis of material 
breach or on the basis of reasonable acts in good faith. The judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of February, 1983. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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